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Chapter 9

The Government~Role in Insuring
Pensions
James E. Pesando

In the event of bankruptcy of the sponsoring firm, a defined pension
plan may be terminated when pension assets are less than accrued pension benefits. If so, governments may elect to provide, either explicitly or
implicitly, plan termination insurance designed to mitigate the corresponding loss in pension benefits suffered by plan members.
There are two distinct aspects to the study of the government's role in
insuring pensions. The first, which is analytical, is to examine whether
governments shauld provide plan termination insurance and, if so, what
steps should be taken so as to ensure the financial soundness of the
insurance fund. The second, which is descriptive, is to document the
international experience with plan termination insurance, to highlight
the similarities and differences in the public policy response to the risk of
bankruptcy.
In the United States, plan termination insurance is provided through
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). In spite of an ongoing series of reforms, the long-term financial soundness of the PBGC
remains a major concern. Against this background, this chapter reviews
the experience with plan termination insurance of five countries: the
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, andJapan.
The fact that opinion is divided as to whether termination insurance is
required is most apparent in Canada. Of the 11 jurisdictions (10 provinces and the government of Canada) that regulate private pension
plans, only one, the Province of Ontario, has introduced plan termination insurance. Further, within a decade of introducing plan termination
insurance in 1980, Ontario was considering its removal. The level of
insured benefits is far more modest in Ontario than in the United States.
Yet there is a parallel concern regarding the long-run solvency of the
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insurance system, in light of the risks posed by a relatively small number
of poorly funded plans and the opportunities for strategic behavior.
This chapter is organized into three sections. The first briefly reviews
the arguments for and against the public provision of plan termination
insurance. The second examines the risks bome by plan members in the
event of bankruptcy for the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan. The third reviews the principal lessons to be
learned from the international experience, using concerns expressed
regarding the PBGC in the United States as a benchmark. This section
includes an overview of the findings together with some implications for
public policy.

The Public Provision of Plan Termination Insurance:
An Overview of the Issues and the Policy Debate
To some policy analysts, the need for plan termination insurance is selfapparent. In its absence, workers in underfunded plans will not receive
their promised pension benefits in the event of the bankruptcy of the
sponsoring firm. Corporate bankruptcies are highly correlated due to
the systematic risk inherent in macroeconomic fluclUations. So, too, are
the returns to pension fund assets. For this reason, private markets may
not be able to provide plan termination insurance, even if demand for
this insurance exists at premium rates that are commensurate with risk.
This "market failure," in the view of many, provides the fundamental
rationale for the public provision of plan termination insurance. I
To economists, however, the argument is less clear. Even if the difficulties - political as well as economic - in designing a financially sound
system of termination insurance are ignored, the fundamental rationale
for its provision merits critical scrutiny.
Virtually all pension analysts, whether economists or not, now accept
the proposition that pension benefits represent deferred wages. In other
words, it is widely recognized that workers "pay" for their accruing pension benefits, either by reduced wages or by concessions elsewhere in
their compensation package. Yet, in a competitive labor market with wellinformed workers, wages will internalize the degree of risk posed by
underfunded pension plans (Pesando 1982). Other things being equal,
firms with fully funded plans or firms with very low probabilities of bankruptcy will extract greater wage concessions for a given level of promised
pension benefits. In the limiting case, workers in poorly funded plans
with a near-bankrupt employer will grant few or no wage concessions in
return for enhanced pension benefits (for example, a retroactive enrichment to a severely underfunded flat benefit plan).
Those who conduct public policy are inclined to evaluate pension
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plans solely in terms of their ability to deliver retirement incomes. Even if
workers have willingly borne the risks associated with plan termination,
policy analysts may find this outcome to be unacceptable. If workers
understand the risks associated with underfunded pension promises, the
economic rationale for the public provision of plan termination insurance may reduce loss of pension benefits, such as increased burden on
public assistance (Mitchell 1993).lfso, the rationale for the public provision of plan termination insurance can be linked to this type of market
failure.
The policy analyst may deem as unrealistic the assumption that workers
(or their agents) understand fully the risks to which they are exposed,
and hence that the appropriate adjustments have taken place elsewhere
in the compensation package. 2 This point is reinforced by the recognition, emphasized by Bodie and Merton (1993), that workers (unlike, for
example, shareholders) typically do not have well-diversified investment
portfolios, and thus may not be well suited to bearing the additional risk
of the loss of pension benefits in the event of the bankruptcy of their
employer. However, if the government's primary concern is that workers
misperceive the security of their contractual benefits, the preferred policy response is to require the disclosure of relevant information. Firms
could be required, for example, to report to each worker the value ofthe
worker's accrued benefit in the event of plan termination, with the presumption that this information would be used in formal or informal
bargaining. 3 If policymakers view the market outcome as unacceptable,
there remains the question of whether a substitute intervention is preferred to termination insurance. There are several obvious candidates.
First and foremost, the government could impose tighter funding requirements. Reduced amortization periods for both experience deficiencies (i.e., actuarial shortfalls due to a divergence between assumptions
and experience) and initial unfunded liabilities would reduce the scope
for underfunding in the event of the sponsor's insolvency. This observation is especially relevant for Canada and the United States, where retroactive (and thus unfunded) enrichments to flat benefit plans in the
union sector represent a major source of underfunding in the private
pension system. A second alternative, for example, would be to elevate
the legal status of unfunded pension benefits in the event of corporate
bankruptcy.
Ifplan termination insurance is provided by the government, there is a
strong economic argument for setting the insurance premiums so as to
reflect the true risk posed to the insurance fund (Ippolito 1986; Pesando
1982; Turner 1993). Yet, as noted later in this chapter, no government
that provides plan termination insurance has set premiums to reflect the
true level of risk exposure. No observed premium structure, for example,
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incorporates the risk of corporate bankruptcy, although universal capital
markets assess this risk on a daily basis in the process of rating corporate
debt. The absence of market-based insurance premiums raises fundamental concerns. First, as is readily apparent in the United States, wellknown moral hazard problems and the strategic behavior of firms will
place the long-run financial soundness of the insurance fund at risk.
Second, in the absence of true risk-based premiums, there is no evidence
that the demand for plan termination insurance exists at maTket-4etermined rates. 4 This observation merits emphasis, since, as noted, many
proponents of the public provision of termination insurance implicitly
assume that demand for insurance coverage exists at a price commensurate with risk.
Finally, one should note that the success of plan termination insurance
in the political arena is not necessarily linked to efficiency concerns.
Rather, its introduction may reflect the response by governments to political interests. Some analysts, for example, see the introduction and
the subsequent evolution of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) in the United States in light of the political objective offorestalJing industrial decline. The cost of the pension benefits provided by firms
in declining industries is shifted, in the first instance, to the third party
insurer. Ultimately, this cost is shifted to prosperous firms through their
inappropriately high insurance premiums, or, in the event of catastrophe, to taxpayers at large. This cross-subsidization, one should emphasize, is endemic to existing termination insurance schemes. In Ontario,
the catalyst to the introduction of plan termination insurance in December 1980 (which was made retroactive) was a series of threatened plant
shutdowns. Not surprisingly, there was no attempt to levy insurance premiums commensurate with the risks posed by these distressed firms.
To levy such premiums might, in and of itself, force these firms into
bankruptcy.5
The preceding review of the arguments for and against the public
provision of termination insurance is, of necessity, brief. 6 In my opinion,
four points stand out. First, there is as yet no persuasive evidence that
demand for termination insurance exists at premiums commensurate
with risk. Thus the "market failure" argument is, as yet, untested. Second, compensating wage differentials will, in a competitive labor market, internalize the risk associated with underfunded pension promises.
Third, there are other policy initiatives - tighter funding requirements,
improved disclosure, bankruptcy reform - that could serve as substitutes
for termination insurance. The potential attractiveness of these alternatives is enhanced by the political and economic obstacles to designing a
financially-sound insurance system in which premiums reflect the true
level of risk posed to the insurer. Fourth, the success of plan termination
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insurance in the political arena may reflect redistributive, rather than
efficiency, considerations.

International Experience with Plan Termination
Insurance
In this section, I briefly review the policies of governments in the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, andJapan with regard to
the provision and operation of plan termination insurance. The operation of the PBGC in the United States, reviewed first, identifies the issues
to be addressed in the discussion of the other four countries. 7

United States
If plans are fully funded (or nearly so), the potential loss of pension
benefits in the event of bankruptcy is small, and the need for plan termination insurance is obviated. Further, the stated intent of United States
government policy is to ensure that, ultimately, most defined benefit
pensions (nominal) are fully funded. It is thus instructive to understand
why, in fact, substantial underfunding of defined benefit pension plans
does exist. As noted by Turner (1993), the degree of underfunding for
some plans is dramatic. In 1988, there were US$ 1.9 billion in unfunded
liabilities in plans with termination funding ratios of 10 percent or less,
and additional unfunded liabilities of US$ 8. I billion in plans with terminal funding ratios of 50 percent or less. 8 The typical claim on the PBGC,
when valued using the PBGC's actuarial assumptions, arises from a plan
that is 40 percent funded (Turner 1993).
There are several reasons for this degree of underfunding, including
strategic underfunding by firms that are in financial distress. Of particular note, however, is the concentration oflarge claims against the PBGC
among the flat benefit plans that predominate in the union sector. A flat
benefit plan pays a fixed periodic amount (such as US$ 20 per month)
for each year of service. To offset the impact of inflation, and to provide
real increases in pension benefits, flat benefit formulas are renegotiated
upward on a periodic basis. Since these enrichments are always retroactive, new- and often quite substantial- unfunded liabilities are periodically created. United States tax law prevents these enrichments from
being pre-funded. (It is not clear, if allowed, that firms would choose to
pre-fund anticipated enrichments since this might weaken their position
in future bargaining over the level of pension benefits.) In effect, flat
benefit plans operate as "surrogate" final earnings plans, but without the
pre-funding that accompanies the latter. Based on experience in the
United States, one would expect that the amount of underfunding - and
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hence the risk borne by the public provider of plan termination insurance - would be less if there were no flat benefit plans in the universe of
defined benefit plans.
The premiums charged each plan for PBGC insurance (which are set
through legislation, not by the PBGC) do not reflect the true risk posed
for the insurance fund. Since 1987, underfunded plans do pay higher
premiums than fully funded plans, although there is a cap on the premium surcharge. 9 There is, however, no allowance for the risk of insolvency of the plan sponsor, nor for the degree of investment risk in the
pension fund. As a result, firms with a low probability of bankruptcy
subsidize firms that are less stable.
Because the insurance premiums are not market-based, there exist
opportunities for strategic behavior; that is, for plan sponsors to "game"
against the interest of the PBGC. As its financial situation deteriorates, a
firm may reduce its plan contributions (through, for example, revising
certain of its actuarial assumptions or requesting a funding waiver from
the Internal Revenue Service), grant enriched pension benefits, and/ or
assume more risk in its pension fund. The incentives created by nonmarket insurance premiums, together with the relatively low priority
of the PBGC's claim on a sponsor's non-pension assets under current
United States bankruptcy law, invite behavior that threatens the long-run
solvency of the PBGC.
There is a limit on the maximum pension benefit that is insured by
the PBGC. In 1993, the maximum insured pension was US$ 2,420 per
month, which is US$ 29,250 per year. There are other ways in which plan
members coinsure the risk of default. Unvested benefits and special supplements for early retirement benefits are not insured, and guaranteed
benefits that are created by plan amendments less than five years old are
phased in at a rate of 20 percent for each year subsequent to the plan
amendment. Because of the "backloading" of pension benefits in most
defined benefit plans (i.e., the tendency for pension accruals to rise
sharply with age and years of service), there is substantial coinsurance by
virtue of the fact that members' benefits are frozen at the date oftermination. Thus, in spite of the existence of termination insurance, plan members do risk a loss of pension benefits in the event of a plan windup due to
the insolvency of the sponsor. lO There is thus some market discipline on
this account.

Canada
The most revealing observation from the Canadian experience is that
only one of 11 jurisdictions (Ontario, in 1980) has introduced plan termination insurance. Nine other provinces and the federal government
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have chosen not to introduce such insurance. (The federal government
has jurisdiction over certain designated industries, such as banking and
telecommunications.) Like the PBGC, the Guarantee Fund was designed
as a self-funding program financed by premiums paid by the sponsors of
defined benefit plans. The Guarantee Fund was established six years after
the PBGC, and was designed to preempt some of the more difficult prol:r
lems that plagued the PBGC." Nonetheless, by the end of the decade,
the government of Ontario was considering abandoning the scheme (accompanied by tighter funding requirements, especially for flat benefit
plans) as the result of concerns regarding financial soundness.
In Canada, as in the United States, flat benefit plans are typically less
well funded than earnings-based plans. Thus the exposure of the Guarantee Fund, as revealed by unfunded liabilities measured on a termination
basis, is largest in the flat benefit plans that predominate in the union
sector. As in the United States, it is the periodic and retroactive enrichments of these plans that generate significant unfunded liabilities.
The premium structure for the Guarantee Fund resembles that of the
PBGC. There is a flat premium per member plus a premium surcharge
related to the degree of underfunding measured on a termination basis.
As in the United States, insurance premiums do not reflect the probability
of bankruptcy of the corporate sponsor, and thus are not set at market
levels on this account.
There is a limit on the maximum pension insured by the Guarantee
Fund: At present, the maximum insured pension is US$ 750 per month,
or US$ 9,000 per year. This maximum insured pension is nominal, and
has not been increased since the Guarantee Fund was introduced in
1980. The maximum pension insured by Ontario's Guarantee Fund is
less than one-third of the maximum pension insured by the PBGC. To
protect the integrity of the Fund, and to limit strategic behavior, certain
enriched early retirement benefits and any benefit enrichment in effect
for less than three years are excluded. Unlike the United States, there is
no provision whereby a financially distressed firm can request a funding
waiver from Revenue Canada, the equivalent to the IRS in the United
States.
The most significant departure from the United States experience is
the absence of plan termination insurance for all plan members in Canada except those subject to Ontario's jurisdiction. This result occurs in
spite of the fact that pension law and regulations are very similar on all
other accounts across the different jurisdictions.
To provide an economic rationale for this disparity is difficult. It seems
unlikely, for example, that policymakers in Ontario reject the "rational
worker" assumption implicit in the analysis of competitive labor markets,
while policymakers in other jurisdictions accept this assumption. If there
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is an unexpected reduction in pension benefits due to a plan insolvency,
there may be an increased claim on Canada's income-tested public pension programs. Yet the most important of these programs, the Guaranteed Income Supplement, is operated by the federal government and is
available to Canadian residents in all the provinces. There is no reason
why Ontario, alone, should respond to this potential externality.
Interestingly, Ontario has always been considered Canada's "industrial
heartland," and the existence of termination insurance only in this province is entirely consistent with a political explanation that is frequently
cited in the United States: that is, that an important, although unstated,
goal for plan termination insurance is to subsidize the cost of pension
benefits (and thus employee compensation) in declining industries.

United Kingdom
State Retirement Pensions in the United Kingdom have two parts. The
first is a fixed benefit component, with a maximum value for a single person in 1994-1995 ofUS$ 86 per week, which is US$ 4,472 per year. The
second part is linked to the worker's earnings, and is known as the State
Earnings Related Pension scheme (SERPs). If an employer-sponsored
plan meets specified criteria, the employer may contract out ofSERPs. In
this event, both the employer's and the employees' National Insurance
contributions are reduced between the lower (about 18 percent of national average earnings) and upper earnings limits (7~ times the lower
limit). Salary-based (defined benefit) plans that contract out are required to provide the additional earnings-related pension known as the
Guaranteed Minimum Pension. The Occupational Pensions Board, a
statutory body, has the responsibility for monitoring plans that have contracted out, and issues the contracting out certificate. At present, about
50 percent of workers in the United Kingdom are covered by an occupational pension plan, and 90 percent of these members have contracted
out of SERPs. In the private sector, 78 percent of members of occupational pension plans have contracted out.
In the United Kingdom, there is, at least for the present, no formal
system of plan termination insurance. In the event of the insolvency of
the plan sponsor, any deficiency in plan assets relative to accrued benefits
is treated as a debt of the employer. If this debt is not repaid, the trustees
of the plan must reduce benefits, according to the priorities established
in the trust deed. The protection of plan members thus relies on the
fiduciary responsibility of the plan's trustees, to ensure that pension assets are sufficient to meet accrued pension benefits.
The absence of a formal system of plan termination insurance, however, is potentially misleading. If the sponsor of a contracted out plan
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goes bankrupt, the Guaranteed Minimum Pensions of its members will
be restored upon transfer of the corresponding plan assets to the state
scheme, even if plan assets are inadequate for this purpose. In effect,
there is implicit termination insurance for Guaranteed Minimum Pensions, but not for benefits in excess of these amounts. No premiums are
levied for this implicit insurance, implying (for example) that there is a
potential cross-subsidy from the employers and employees of financially
sound'firms to their counterparts in less stable firms.
Occupational pension plans that contract out of SERPs usually provide
benefits in excess ofthe Guaranteed Minimum Pension. Thus, in spite of
the implicit termination insurance described above, most members of
contracted-{)ut defined benefit plans are at risk in the event of their
employer's insolvency if pension assets are less than accrued pension
liabilities. The trustees of the plan, in order to serve the interests of the
beneficiaries of the trust (i.e., the members of the plan), have an obligation after each actuarial valuation to ensure that steps are taken to eliminate any shortfall of assets relative to accrued liabilities.
For perspective, it would appear that the effective level of termination
insurance in the United Kingdom is close to that provided in Ontario,
but well beneath the level that exists in the United States. Christopher
Daykin (Chapter 2, this volume) notes that the target replacement rate
for SERPs is 25 percent of average earnings in the range between the
lower and upper earnings limits. The lower limit is (about) 18 percent of
national average earnings, and the upper limit is 135 percent of national
average earnings. The Guaranteed Minimum Pension, which is protected by implicit plan termination insurance, is thus equal to (about) 30
percent of national average earnings. 12
If the sponsor of a contracted-out plan goes bankrupt, then those
pensions that replace social security pensions are treated as if bought
back into SERPs, even if the plan's assets are insufficient to do so. To
protect the integrity of SERPs, the Occupational Pensions Board has the
statutory responsibility to ensure that employers fully fund the accrued
liabilities in respect to Guaranteed Minimum Pensions. If a plan fails to
demonstrate that it has adequate resources, the Occupational Pensions
Board may withdraw the right to contract out of SERPs. At present, the
only funding requirement set out in regulations is that the pension plan
have assets at least equal to the Guaranteed Minimum Pensions of its
members. No statutory requirement is imposed, in general, if the funding level of the plan is less than 100 percent as established by its actuarial
valuation. Further, the actuarial valuation, which must be made at least
every three and a half years, need not provide the details of the method or
the assumptions used in the calculation.
Following the highly publicized shortfalls in the Maxwell pension
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plans, policy analysts in the United Kingdom have recently revisited the
question of plan termination insurance. The Pension Law Review Committee has recommended that a compensation fund be established, to
cover shortfalls (only) if there has been fraud or theft of assets. The
Committee has made a number of other recommendations designed to
enhance the security of promised pension benefits.
From a North American perspective, two additional observations merit
note. First, the problem of underfunding, so evident among distressed
firms in the United States, does not appear to be a major problem in the
United Kingdom. 13 This may reflect the fact that the members of defined
benefit plans are in plans in which pensions are linked to salary at or near
retirement. There are, apparently, no flat benefit plans whose periodic
(and retroactive) enrichments are the primary source of underfunding
in Canada and the United States. Second, at least for benefits in excess of
Guaranteed Minimum Pensions, statutory funding and monitoring requirements appear to be less stringent than in either Canada or the
United States.

Germany
In Germany, the book reserve method is the primary system for financing
employer-sponsored pension plans. 14 Unlike the United States, Canada,
and the United Kingdom, pension liabilities are not secured by pension
assets held in a separate trust. In Germany, the employer has a direct
liability to pay promised pension benefits, and these benefits are paid out
of company, not pension, assets. Financing takes the form of the accrual
of book reserves. IS To protect the promised pension benefits in the event
of the employer'S bankruptcy, the book reserve system is accompanied,
since 1974, by mandatory insolvency insurance. Insolvency insurance is
provided by the Pensions-Sicherungs-Verein (PSVaG), a mutual insurance corporation.
In the event of bankruptcy, the PSVaG is required to pay all the pension
benefits due under the terms of the employer's plan. These include
pensions that are currently in pay, together with the pension benefits that
are legally vested at the time of the bankruptcy. The PSVaG is not required to pay a monthly pension in excess of three times the Social
Security Contribution Ceiling. However, this is a very large amount,
equal to US$ 165,000 per year. Certain pension benefits - such as enrichments granted in the last year prior to insolvency that exceed the benefits
granted in the prior year-are excluded from coverage. This is analogous to steps taken by the PBGC in the United States and the Guarantee
Fund in Ontario to limit the scope for strategic behavior against the
interests of the public provider of termination insurance. Insured bene-
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fits are paid in full even if the bankruptcy involves criminal behavior on
the part of management, and even if the firm is not current in its required contributions to the PSVaG.
Employers are required by law to make contributions sufficient to finance the insolvency insurance on a pay-as-you-go basis.'6 Required contributions are based on the size of the employer's pension liabilities,
including pensions in pay to retired workers. The contribution rate, like
its counterparts in North America, is not linked to a measure of the
likelihood of the firm's insolvency. For this reason, the insurance premiums levied by the PSVaG are not market-determined rates; that is, the
true risks of a claim on the insurance fund are not internalized into
insurance premiums. There is thus a cross-subsidy, as in North America,
from stable to less financially secure firms. The annual contribution rate
is set equal to the ratio of the capital required in the year by the PSVaG to
the total amount of employers' liabilities for pension benefits. In 1975,
the contribution rate was set equal to 0.15 percent. Since then, it has
fluctuated from year to year. To date, the highest contribution rate occurred in 1982, at 0.69 percent; the lowest, in 1990, was at 0.03 percent
(Peter Ahrend, Chapter 3, this volume). The high contribution rate in
1982 reflects the claim arising from a major company in the electronics
industry.
In the United States, the PBGC levies premiums based, in part, on the
amount by which pension assets fall short of pension liabilities. In Germany, there are no pension assets if the employer uses the book reserve
system. From this perspective, the fact that the PSVaG levies premiums on
the full amount of the employer's pension liabilities is a parallel policy,
since this is the amount by which pension liabilities exceed pension assets. Ironically, there is nothing analogous in Germany to the major concern of policy analysts in the United States: the apparent success of firms
in financial distress to underfund their pension liabilities, to the detriment of the PBGC.
From the perspective of North America, the apparent lack of concern
regarding the financial soundness of the PSVaG is surprising. In large
part, this may reflect the relatively favorable experience of the PSVaG, at
least to date. From 1988 to 1992, for example, the required contribution
rate averaged 0.07 percent. This is one-half the average contribution rate
(0.14 percent) required during the five years (1975-1979) immediately
following the creation of the PSVaG.
Yet, if a small number of large firms were to experience financial distress, the required contribution rate could rise sharply. (In 1982, the
contribution rate rose to 0.69 percent, more than triple the contribution
rate in 1981.) Further, adverse selection would appear to present more of
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a problem than in the United States, since the cross-subsidy from secure
to less stable firms appears to be more pronounced. Perhaps, the tax-subsidized self-financing available to secure firms who use the book reserve
method provides a strong enough incentive to prevent their seeking to
exit the system by adopting a different type of financing arrangement for
their pension plans (such as setting up a pension fund). In Germany,
benefit enrichments in the year immediately preceding bankruptcy that
exceed those granted in the previous year are excluded from insurance
coverage. Yet this response to the moral hazard problem seems to be less
onerous, and thus less ofa constraint on strategic behavior, than does the
five-year phase-in rule imposed by the PBGC.17

Japan
Historically, a distinguishing feature of the Japanese pension system has
been the Lump Sum Retirement Benefit plan, financed on a book reserve basis. Tax Qualified Pension Plans (TQP) were introduced in 1962
and Employees' Pension Fund (EPF) plans were introduced in 1966. As a
result, there are a number of possible financing arrangements for defined benefit pension plans in Japan. This fact, together with continued
changes in the retirement income system, complicate the task of assessing the role of termination insurance inJapan.
A TQP plan must be funded through a financial institution, such as a
life insurance company. An EPF is a contracted-out plan-more specifically, a plan that is a substitute for the earnings-related component of the
Employees' Pension Insurance. The latter is the earnings-related public
pension plan that covers the majority of workers in the private sector. To
qualify for contracting out, the employer must establish the EPF as a legal
entity separate from the plan sponsor, and provide a pension benefit that
is at least 30 percent more generous than the social security benefits that
are being replaced. An EPF, unlike a lump sum plan, is advance-funded.
Like TQP plans, most EPF plans are managed by life insurance companies or trust banking comparies. Firms that provide a book reserve
plan may also provide a TQP or EPF.
The risk borne by plan members in the event of insolvency varies with
the type of plan to which the member belongs. Since 1976, employers
who sponsor book reserve plans have been required to guarantee this
amount with a financial institution. In fact, Noriyasu Watanabe (Chapter
4, this volume) reports that the majority of employers do not guarantee
their book-reserve plans, as the regulations are laxly enforced. As a result,
it would appear that the lump sum payments due plan members remain
at risk in the event of the insolvency of their employer.
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There is no termination insurance for TQP plans, so members remain
at risk in the event of the bankruptcy of their employer. For these plans,
however, this risk is mitigated by the requirement of advance funding.
In 1989 the Pension Guarantee Program was established to provide
plan termination insurance to members of EPF plans. EPF plans are
required to make contributions to the insurance program. Noriyasu
Watanabe (Chapter 4, this volume) indicates that the contributions required of plan sponsors reflect the statistical likelihood of termination as
well as the unfunded liability if the plan is terminated. As previously
noted, insurance premiums in the United States, Canada, and Germany
do not attempt to distinguish among firms on the basis of their differing
probabilities of bankruptcy. It would appear that the proxy for financial
soundness in Japan is simply the size of the employer, as the required
contribution per participant declines gradually as the number of participants increases. As of 1994, there had been only one plan termination
under the Pension Guarantee Program, and this plan was sufficiently well
funded that there was no claim on the insolvency insurance program.
Consequently, unlike the case in Canada and the United States, there is
no apparent concern regarding the solvency of the insurance fund.

An Overview of the International Experience
In spite of an ongoing series of reforms, the long-term financial soundness of the PBGC remains a major concern in the United States. Indeed,
many analysts (Bodie 1992; Smalhout 1993) draw attention to the potential parallel with the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), which ultimately failed at tremendous cost to the United States
taxpayer. Common concerns include, for example, the lack of market
discipline, the opportunities for strategic behavior by the insureds, and
regulator forbearance.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comparison of international
experience with plan termination insurance, with particular attention
to common problems and attempts at their solution. In this context,
the PBGC provides a useful benchmark against which the experience of
other countries can be compared. The most salient observations are
summarized below.
With the exception of Germany, the level of benefits insured by the
PBGC (a maximum of US$ 2,420 per month or US$ 29,040 per year in
1993) is high by international standards. The higher the level of the
insured benefit, the higher is the value of the protection afforded to plan
members, other things being equal. On the other hand, the higher, too,
is the potential exposure of the public provider oftermination insurance.
The risk exposure of the PBGC is concentrated among collectively
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bargained flat benefit benefits, where retroactive benefit enrichments
generate new unfunded liabilities on a periodic basis. The experience in
Ontario is similar. In the United Kingdom, the Guaranteed Minimum
Pensions in contracted-out plans are earnings-related and, as a result, less
likely to be underfunded. In Germany, the type of defined benefit formula is not an issue, since there is no advance funding with the book
reserve system.
A major concern in the United States is the apparent ability of financially distressed firms to underfund their pension plans, thereby increasing the risk borne by the PBGC. There is no advance funding by those
firms in Germany that adopt the book reserve method of financing their
pension plans, so this dimension of strategic behavior is simply not relevant. Yet, as of 1994, there appears to be no public policy concern in
Germany regarding the financial soundness of the PSVaG.
In Ontario and Germany, as well as in the United States, there is no
attempt to incorporate the probability of bankruptcy into the setting of
insurance premiums. As a result, there is a potentially large cross-subsidy
from financially secure to less secure firms. In the United Kingdom, an
analogous situation exists with regard to the implicit insurance provided
to Guaranteed Minimum Pensions in contracted-{)ut plans. In Japan,
there appears to be an attempt to incorporate the likelihood of bankruptcy into the setting of insurance premiums, but only to the extent that
the size of the firm (as measured by the number of plan participants) is
used as a proxy for the firm's financial soundness.
To contain the evident moral hazard problem, recently granted enrichments to pension plans are not immediately covered by plan termination
insurance. It would appear that Germany has the least demanding requirement. Yet, as previously noted, there seems to be little public concern about the financial soundness of PSVaG.
The problem of adverse selection is relatively unimportant in the
United States, Ontario, and the United Kingdom, where participation is
compulsory. In Germany, firms may choose not to use the book reserve
method. By setting up a pension fund, the firm can avoid participation in
the PSVaG. Presumably, other things being equal, financially sound firms
have the strongest incentive to avoid participating in the PSVaG.
In those countries where explicit termination insurance exists (i.e., all
countries except for the United Kingdom), there is no distinction between insurance claims that do or those that do not arise from fraud or
other employer malfeasance. In the United Kingdom, the Pension Law
Review Committee has recommended that a compensation fund be established to protect promised pensions only in the event that there has
been fraud or theft of assets.
The "big" question regarding plan termination insurance is whether,
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in fact, it is needed. In a competitive labor market with well-informed
agents, the wages paid to workers will internalize the risk of promised
pension benefits. This seems to be a persuasive argument in the case of
collectively bargained plans, where underfunding in North America is
concentrated. The apparent willingness of younger workers to accept the
risks associated with underfunded flat benefit plans should be seen in the
context of other objectives - in particular, the goal of encouraging and
facilitating the retirement of older workers in order to enhance job security.18 In the alternative, policy makers might deem the loss of pension
benefits to be an unacceptable outcome, even if this possibility has been
appropriately internalized into the compensation packages of affected
workers. In this event, there remains the policy option of using tighter
funding requirements as a means of reducing the risks that workers can,
in fact, choose to bear. This could be accomplished, for example, by
requiring very rapid amortization of any unfunded liabilities created by
retroactive enrichments to flat benefit plans. 19
As noted, Ontario began to consider the abandonment of plan termination insurance within a decade of its introduction. As the Ministry of
Financial Institutions writes:
There is a risk that the PBGF will lack sufficient funds to meet current and
future liabilities and that its potential liabilities cannot be known with certainty.
As a result, the government is considering whether to maintain the Pension
Benefits Guarantee Fund, possibly on a restructured basis designed to balance
the potential liabilities and Fund assets, or whether to eliminate the Fund and
strengthen the responsibilities of plan sponsors and plan members to provide for
protection of benefits. (1989)

If the Guarantee Fund were eliminated, Ontario would take additional
steps to improve the funding position of poorly funded plans. 20 In this
context, the Ontario government highlights the special concern with
underfunded flat benefit plan (Ministry of Financial Institutions): "The
Superintendent of Pensions could be given the authority to deny approval of benefit enhancements which increase plan liabilities where the
plan is funded at less than a prescribed level. This would not include statutory benefit improvements, but would require that supplementary benefits be adequately funded. It is recognized that such a restriction might
be opposed as undue interference in the collective bargaining process
and in some cases could impose limitations on negotiated benefits. However, for poorly funded plans it would represent an important safeguard
to protect the benefits of both active and retired plan members."
With the change of government in Ontario in 1990, the question of
whether the Guarantee Fund should be terminated is no longer under
active consideration. However, the maximum insured benefit has re-
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mained at US$ 750 per month since the creation of the Guarantee Fund.
The real value of this ceiling has declined sharply, by 49 percent since
1980 and by 13 percent since 1989. In the United States, by contrast, the
maximum insured benefit rises by the same factor used to escalate social
security benefits. From this perspective, the importance of plan termination insurance in Ontario has effectively declined through a policy of
benign neglect.

Conclusion
The "market failure" argument for the public provision of plan termination insurance is, at least superficially, appealing. In the absence of termination insurance, members of underfunded plans will suffer a loss of
pension benefits if their employer goes bankrupt. Further, the public
provision of plan termination insurance has met with considerable success in the political arena.
Economic analysis, however, suggests that the fundamental rationale
for insurance is less clear. Equally important, no country has, as of 1994,
sought to levy insurance premiums commensurate with the level of risk.
In the United States, this fact underlies the continuing concern about
the long-run financial soundness of the PBGC. The fact that marketbased insurance premiums have never been levied indicates that the
"market failure" argument has not been tested: there is as yet no evidence that the demand for insurance exists at premiums commensurate
with risk. Since bankruptcy risk is not incorporated into the premium
structure, profitable firms effectively subsidize unprofitable firms. This
fact, in turn, invites the interpretation that the success of termination
insurance in the political arena is due to redistributive, rather than to
efficiency, considerations.
1 am indebted to John Turner, Olivia Mitchell, Carolyn Weaver, and
Dallas Salisbury for useful suggestions.

Notes

'Ippolito (1986, 1989) discusses possible efficiency arguments in support of
introducing plan termination insurance (the PBGC) in the United States. He
discusses, as well, the possibility that the PBGC was designed to benefit unprofitable firms with poorly funded plans at the expense of profitable firms with wellfunded plans.
21nman (1982) provides evidence that some public sector workers in the
United States, whose benefits are not insured by the PBGe, receive higher wages
in poorly funded plans.
'In light of a topical concern in the United Kingdom, one should note that
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there is no suggestion in this formal analysis that wages will internalize the risk of
funding shortfalls due to fraud perpetrated by the employer. While information
on the funded status of the pension plan is readily disclosed, such is not the case
for information regarding the likelihood ofemployer malfeasance. This does not,
however, necessarily provide a rationale for government intervention. Ippolito
(1986), for example, points out that private markets can and do insure against
fraud or incompetence among pension fund managers.
4As noted by Ippolito (1986) and others, plan sponsors could be required to
obtain insurance for their pension liabilities in private markets. This requirement
would ensure that insurance premiums are set at market levels. The role of the
governmen t in this system would be to provide reinsurance in the event of systemwide adverse experience. Weaver (1993) proposes that the insurance function, as
distinct from the transfer functions, of the PBGC be shifted to the private sector.
In the absence of market-based pricing of insurance, and again as emphasized by
Weaver (1993), the financially secure firms that subsidize their less healthy counterparts face a continuing incentive to opt out of the system by (for example)
terminating their defined benefit plans and replacing them with defined contribution plans. Finally, the difficulties of the public insurer in setting risk-related
insurance premiums merit emphasis. It is well known, for example, that the
financial strength of the plan sponsor and the degree of underfunding should
both be reflected in the premium structure. As emphasized by Bodie (1994), the
mismatch between the degree of risk of the insured benefits, akin to (nominal)
long-term debt, and the degree of risk of the pension assets is an important
determinant of the long-run exposure of the public insurer. This factor, too,
should be reflected in the insurance premium.
5The unwillingness of Ontario to levy risk-based insurance premiums eliminates the alternative strategy of mandating insurance coverage and inviting private insurers to enter the market. Ontario's insurance was made retroactive, for
ongoing plans, to 1965. This is the year in which the Pensions Benefit Act of
Ontario came into effect.
6Additional issues include, for example, the complications posed by the fact
that termination insurance may cover only nominal (i.e., not real) pension benefits, together with the possibility that underfunding per se may provide efficiency
gains by ensuring that workers have an important stake in the financial solvency
of their employers (Ippolito 1985, 1986). To the extent that plan termination insurance subsidizes the compensation of older workers in declining industries, the
public provision of this insurance may entail significant intergenerational transfers. The transfer of resources across generations, whether planned or not, has
received increased attention by economists in recent years. Finally, an argument
in support of pension insurance pertains to the market for "lemons." There are
some "lemons" in the pension market, but workers have difficulty distinguishing
them from reputable pension promises. As a result, workers give up smaller wage
concessions to good firms than they would if they were assured that there is little
or no risk to the pension promises of those firms. For good firms, the "unfair"
pension insurance is the price they pay to assure their workers that their pension
promises are reliable. For risks taken while young, individuals can offset losses
through their labor market behavior as well as through their consumption. For
risks taken later in life, however, individuals must absorb losses through reductions in consumption. Because they are less able to bear risk while old, workers are
more likely to favor low risk retirement assets. For this reason, workers may prefer
pension benefit insurance even though they are willing to accept other risks.
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7For the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, the discussion draws heavily
on Daykin (Chapter 2, this volume), Ahrend (Chapter 3, this volume), and Watanabe (Chapter 4, this volume). See also Clark (1991) for additional details
regarding the retirement system inJapan. Other countries with plan termination
insurance include Sweden, Finland, and Chile.
"These statistics are based on single employer plans with 100 or more members.
9In 1992 the premiums for fully funded plans were equal to US$ 19 per participant; for underfunded plans, US$ 19 per participant plus US$ ninefor each US$
1,000 of unfunded vested benefits per participant, to a maximum of an additional
US$ 72 per participant. A plan with a large unfunded liability could thus be
charged an insurance premium up to US$ 91 per participant. See Turner (1993)
for further details. See Munnell (1982) for a discussion of the PBGC as structured
at the time of its introduction.
lOIn a widely discussed and controversial case, LTV Corporation established, in
1987, follow-on plans that provided its workers with substantially the same benefits as in the underfunded plans that LTV wound up in 1986, transferring significant unfunded liabilities to the PBGC in the process.
IIIn Ontario, for example, the insured event has always been the insolvency of
the plan sponsor. Further, the Guarantee Fund in Ontario has a lien on employer
assets equal to the full amount of the insured shortfall of pension assets. There is
no provision, unlike the United States, for funding waivers if the employer is
experiencing financial difficulties. In spite of these steps, the potential for a
financial crisis is both real and acknowledged. For the year ending March 31,
1993, the Guarantee Fund reports that there were 37 potential claims relating to
the closure of 31 companies, with a potential liability to the Fund of US$ 27
million.
l"This figure is equal to 25 percent, the target replacement rate, times 117 (Le.,
135 less 18) percent of national average earnings.
I'This observation is, of necessity, tentative. Daykin (1991) reports that there is
no centrally gathered information on the funded status of private sector plans.
14Ahrend (Chapter 3, this volume) reports that book reserves presently account for about 70 percent of the funds set aside to provide for employer-sponsored pension benefits.
I'The book reserve appropriations made by the employer are tax-deductible.
When pension benefits are paid, book reserves are reduced and the firm's taxable
profits rise accordingly.
16The PSVaG does not pay insured benefits directly. Rather, the PSVaG buys the
requisite annuities from a consortium of life insurance companies. For pensions
in pay at the time of bankruptcy, the PSVaG purchases the necessary annuity
contracts immediately from the consortium of life insurance companies.
17In theory, a firm facing imminent bankruptcy in the United States might
grant benefit enrichments far in excess of those that it would grant if it were
solvent. In spite of the five-year phase-in rule, the firm could succeed in enriching
its workers at the expense of the PBGC.
I"There remains, of course, the question of whether young workers (in particular) understand the nature of their employer's pensions (Mitchell 1988). As
noted, Ippolito (1986) has argued that the underfunding of flat benefit plans
serves to make union members resemble bondholders of the firm, thereby providing union members with a strong incentive to ensure the firm's solvency.
19Iftighter funding requirements were to replace the public provision oftermination insurance as a means of reducing the risk of employer-sponsored pen-
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sions, the nature of the public policy debate might shift in new directions. For
example, the government might consider issuing indexed bonds as a means of
facilitating the preservation of real pension benefits during retirement. (In the
United Kingdom, and more recently in Canada, government index bonds already
exist.) In this context, it is worth emphasizing, for example, that the PBGC in the
United States insures nominal, not real, pension benefits.
2()There is, of course, no reason to view such initiatives solely as a substitute for
plan termination insurance. Such initiatives could, evidently, compkment a system
of plan termination insurance.
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Comments by Carolyn L. Weaver

In light of the growing concern over the solvency of the United States
pension insurance system, and the potential for a savings-and-loan-style
taxpayer bailout of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, James
Pesando has written a timely and important chapter on how five major
nations have chosen to deal with securing employer pension promises.
He provides a wealth of information on, and documents a fairly significant degree of variation in, pension insurance arrangements in other
countries. This variation in arrangements suggests some fruitful avenues
offuture research.
In the United States, there is a formal system of pension insurance
operated on a monopoly basis by the federal government and based only
loosely on insurance principles. By contrast, most of Canada operates
without pension insurance; the United Kingdom relies on an implicit
system in which the government guarantees a minimum pension (with
no explicit pricing of that guarantee or financing of the implied debt),
requires full funding of that pension, and imposes on employers liability
for any pension fund shortfalls in the event of bankruptcy; and Japan
operates a system that is a hybrid of the United States and the Canadian
systems, with some pensions uninsured and some pensions insured by the
government with (apparently) some attempt to risk-relate premiums.
This variation would lead any good economist to long to see the next
study - the one that attempts to quan tity, empirically, the effects of these
institutional differences on underfunded plan terminations and on the
solvency (or implicit debt) of pension insurance systems. It leads a political economist like myself to long to see the study that attempts to explain
the variation in institutions across countries.
Given the more limited purpose of this chapter, which is to compare
and contrast institutions, some critical details about the design of pension insurance systems warrant further elaboration. For example, what
precisely is the event against which countries are attempting to insure,
referred to loosely as the "insolvency" of insured plan sponsors, and how
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much discretion do sponsors retain over the timing of that event? Is
it financial distress (how much distress?), negative net worth, or bankruptcy and liquidation, and how much pension debt can the company
pile up as that event approaches? What kind of claims do workers (or the
government insurer) have on the non-pension assets of plan sponsors,
and what is the status of these claims in bankruptcy proceedings? How
are minimum funding requirements monitored and enforced? What are
the restrictions, if any, on investment practices? More generally, since all
countries (with the possible exception ofJapan) reject risk-based pricing,
how precisely is moral hazard controlled other than by limiting benefit
guarantees? While Pesando addresses some of these issues for some of the
countries, a more thorough exposition would be helpful.
As a related point, I would have found it helpful to see some concrete
data on the actual and expected future claims experience in other countries. In the United States, for example, the concentration oflarge claims
in unionized firms offering flat benefit plans tells us a great deal about
the efficacy of our funding rules and premium structure as well as the
probable political purpose of pension insurance.
Were we to try to draw inferences from a study such as this about the effects of public pension insurance on, say, the retirement income choices
open to workers, the ability of firms to respond flexibly to changing market conditions, the security of retirement incomes, or, more generally,
economic efficiency, we would need to know still more. In particular,
what is the tax, legal, regulatory, and labor market environment within
which private pensions exist? How important are defined benefit pensions to retirement income saving? Are close substitutes available for
insured pensions?
In the United States, for example, we have an enormous, well-developed private pension system, a variety of tax-preferred means of saving for
retirement, competitive labor markets, and a mobile workforce.· These
factors tend to limit the costs that can be imposed on the private sector
through a poorly designed public program, while simultaneously creating
a potentially large adverse selection problem for the government insurer.
While these latter questions go well beyond those that Pesando attempts to address, they are critical to evaluating the likely costs and benefits of pension insurance.
This brings me to Pesando's discussion of the economic rationale for
pension insurance. Although he makes clear that his purpose is not to
evaluate why governments should adopt pension insurance, he nevertheless touches on this subject and, in so doing, leaves unresolved a number
of important issues.
Pesando presents three economic rationales or so-called "market failure" arguments for pension insurance:
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•
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Imperfect information in labor markets, whereby workers (or their
agents) can not properly perceive the risks of an underfunded termination and thus wages do not fully internalize these risks;
Paternalism, whereby workers properly perceive the risks and wages
adjust, but we (somebody!) nevertheless wish to protect them from
the loss of pension wealth; and
An externality for taxpayers, whereby losses of pension wealth from
unanticipated, underfunded terminations result in increased public
assistance expenditures.

As a student of public finance and public economics, these rationales
raise three questions in my mind:

•
•
•

Are they sound market failure arguments, worthy of attention in this
chapter?
If so, what specific public policies would they suggest?
Are the benefits of government action likely to outweigh the costs? In
other words, as James Buchanan has taught me to ask, how does the
supposed market failure stack up against the potential for government failure, recognizing that public policies emerge from imperfect
political institutions?

From this perspective, it is quite a stretch to get from any of these
supposed market failures to a compulsory system of pension insurance
organized around a monopoly public supplier, such as was created in the
United States and to a greater or lesser degree in Ontario and the other
countries studied.
As Pesando notes, the imperfect information argument (weak on its
face in competitive labor markets) suggests policies designed to improve
the information available to workers. For example, firms might be required to disclose workers' accrued benefits in the event of bankruptcy
and the proportion of benefits that could be met with pension fund (or
other) assets on hand. Pension insurance, by contrast, which shields
workers from the loss of pension wealth, tends to weaken incentives to
become informed about the ability ofemployers to back up their pension
promises.
The second rationale, paternalism, is very nearly illogical on its face as
a market failure argument. It implies that there is an identifiable group
of people (i.e., paternalists) who cares about and is willing to pay some
price to protect workers from pension losses even though these workers
have already been compensated for the risk of loss through the wage
premiums they extract from companies offering riskier pensions. While
it is clear who comprises the recipient group, presumably the millions of
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workers who are or may one day be covered by pensions, who are the
paternalists? Taxpayers other than workers? If so, it is not clear how
pension insurance would be financed so that the true costs would be
borne by paternalists rather than by the intended recipients. It is also not
clear why the concerns of paternalists would not extend to workers covered by defined contribution plans who knowingly expose themselves to
more investment risk than participants in defined benefit plans.
It would probably be more constructive to think in terms of the gains
that might accrue to self-interested workers seeking to reduce the variability of pension outcomes. As Zvi Bodie and Robert Merton (1993)
have explained, even if wages adjust to reflect the riskiness of pensions,
workers may still prefer less pension risk because of the large, non-diversifiable stake they typically have in the firms in which they work. Since, in
their view, the primary function of defined benefit pensions is to offer a
specified benefit at retirement, it follows that "the function is less efficiently performed if the contract ... calls for the benefit to be paid in
the joint event that the employee retirees and the firm is still solvent."2
From this perspective, no paternalists are required to generate a demand for institutions to reduce the risk of default, and there are marketbased responses or, at least, less costly government responses. For example, plan sponsors could reduce default risk by contracting with life insurance companies to provide pension annuities. Alternatively, pension
claims could be given priority over the claims of other creditors in bankruptcy proceedings (Keating 1991; Lindeman 1993; Bodie and Merton
1993), or firms could be required to demonstrate their ability to meet
promised benefits by purchasing a guarantee from a private financial
institution (Weaver forthcoming; Smalhout 1993).
Finally, the externality rationale cannot properly be described as a
market failure since the underlying problem is a pre-existing government
program - public assistance. There is a fiscal externality, but it is created
by government. As the history of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation amply demonstrates, much justification for government intervention derives from trying to fix problems created by earlier interventions.
This fiscal externality, moreover, has been used to justifY everything from
mandatory private pensions to social security and thus provides little
guidance as to the appropriate policy response.
As some measure of the importance, empirically, of this rationale, Pesando makes the interesting observation that in Canada, where the major
public assistance program is national in scope, neither the national government, nor nine out often provinces, have been moved to control this
potential fiscal externality through pension insurance.
In sum, even if a market failure existed and it were demonstrated to be
empirically important, a government-run pension insurance program
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that hews to insurance principles in name only - which is the only model
we have of explicit pension insurance in any of the major countries
studied-is probably the least appropriate policy response. Apart from
the economic inefficiencies that are likely to result, such a program will
(through mispricing and other problems) tend to discourage new companies from adopting defined benefit plans and encourage healthy companies with well-funded plans to discontinue them, thereby undermining
rather than securing the defined benefit pension system. Information
disclosure requirements, superpriority status for pensions in bankruptcy
proceedings, and requirements that employers guarantee their pension
promises through private financial institutions all appear to be policies
that would address the same basic problems with fewer economic distortions. That we do not see much political demand for policies like these
underscores the fact that rationales for government policy rarely constitute explanations.
Pesando's discussion of pension insurance in Ontario, Canada's "industrial heartland" makes clear that he is aware of this important distinction.
Pension economists would do well to move beyond the normative question of why we should have pension insurance to how we can bring about
constructive reform of existing programs that redistribute wealth in predictable ways to entrenched political interests (Ippolito 1989; Weaver
forthcoming). The political interests I have in mind are workers and
shareholders in unionized firms in declining industries. Few pension
analysts today would dispute the fact that, at least in the United States
(and apparently in Ontario), pension insurance is a form of industrial
policy - a system of cheap pension guarantees (to use a phrase coined by
Bodie and Merton) designed to prop up unionized firms in declining
industries.
Elsewhere I have argued for moving toward a system of private, competitively supplied pension insurance for all new companies and for existing companies that are commercially insurable (Weaver forthcoming).
Companies with poorly funded plans and an unusual risk of default
would continue to receive subsidized "insurance" from the government,
only the subsidies would be financed from the general fund of the Treasury (rather than from workers and shareholders in other companies)
and limited by strict standards that precluded any deliberate increases
in exposure. For most companies, this new arrangement would amount
to privatizing the supply of pension insurance subject to a government
mandate.
Canada offers yet another model of privatization - apparently pure
privatization-where workers in most provinces are compensated for
pension default risks through the wage offers they accept (and may be
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protected by employers in other ad hoc ways) but are not formally insured in the event of pension losses. Unfortunately, none ofthe countries
of the world offers an example of how to structure a transition back to a
private system or to one explicitly disciplined by market forces once having taken the path of government-administered insurance.
Notes

lAs noted in Ippolito (forthcoming), the most important of these, in terms of
providing a close substitute for defined benefit plans, may be the 401 (k) plan, a
type of defined contribution plan into which employers can shift compensation
and yet retain some of the bonding (or tenure) effects of defined benefit plans.
'See Bodie and Merton (1993). For an alternative view of pensions, see Ippolito (1987, 1988), who argues that workers and shareholders both stand to gain
from some degree of default risk arising from underfunding. In his view, underfunding gives workers a stake in the long-term viability of firms and thus tends to
align the interests of workers and shareholders.
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Comments by Dallas L. Salisbury

The discussion ofPBGC and the guaranty programs it administers has at
times been heated. The more normative the commentator the more
oriented he or she will be toward a casualty insurance model that is more
critical ofthe program.
Agree or not, Congress intended a social insurance model- that is,
explicit subsidy within the defined benefit system. The original bill included far more than present law. The Contingent Employer Liability
Insurance (CELl) called for by the original statute, and amended out of
the law in the 1980s, would have raised far larger issues had it been
implemented.
The original multi-employer program carried risks. It was changed
with two initial results: protection of PBGC and no new multi-employer
pension plans. Now that many ofthose plans are fully funded, employers
are leaving. PBGC was protected; benefits promised will be paid but the
system froze. Is that in the public interest? Is there no room for risk?
Should we seek the same type of "stability" in the single employer defined benefit area? I do not claim to have the answers, but I do think we
sometimes rush to judgments that are not in the long-term interests of
economic security.
Much is said about PBCC and incentives. The existence of the program
raises some interesting questions:
•
•
•

•

Has government interest in having plans well funded to protect the
PBGC in any way balanced desires to reduce tax incentives?
Does the program in effect place some break on benefit increases and
better funding to avoid higher premiums?
Does the program encourage strong employers to care more about
the practices of others and to pay more attention to pensions when
mergers, acquisitions and spinoffs are being discussed?
Does the program serve to enhance confidence in the economy and
the pension system, thus leading to a stronger economy?
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Does the program make elected officials and citizens feel better?
Given that public policy is at base paternalistic, do PBGC and defined
benefit plans serve to hold down other government spending?

I would also harken back to the issue of privatization of the PBGC
program. I served on groups that looked into this issue. They were created by advocates who concluded it would not work. Why? Because the
underwriting standards the insurers said they would need went too far.
The conclusion was that the strong would drop plans and the weak would
not be able to obtain insurance at a price they could afford and would
"leave" also. A short field day in the courts and for the servers, but an
ultimate loss for participants, beneficiaries, and the public interest in
economic security.
Against this backdrop, I suggest that the chapter by James Pesando
provides a good summary overview of the pension termination guaranty
programs in major industrial nations.
Pesando aptly points out that many policy analysts concerned about
pension security see the need for such programs as self-evident. Without
such programs, as the author notes, benefits might be lost. As critical to
advocates of defined benefit pension arrangements is the relative public
policy stability that such a program makes possible. The United States
program resulted from public upheaval over the bankruptcy of the Studebaker auto company in 1954. Workers and employers were able to
compromise on the concept of "social insurance" as a price for having
defined benefit pension plans.
Economists question the need for a pension guaranty program, Pesando states, because of a belief that pensions are deferred wages. As
such, the loss ofa pension is the worker/retiree's problem. It maybe true
that "virtually all pension analysts ... now accept the proposition that
pension benefits represent deferred wages." As for "non-" analysts, I
think many of them accept the proposition in theory in bargained situations, but in many other situations its acceptance is far less clear in the
case of defined benefit plans, which may go many years with no new
contributions, than with defined contribution plans, which make regular
contributions. Present cash compensation practices pay little attention to
the benefits promised in assessing the cash necessary to meet the competition. Discussion of "total compensation" continues, but few actually
practice it, even though "in the long run" it may work its way through the
labor market as deferred wages.
Pesando suggests that the program may simply be a form of paternalism. I would suggest it is both that and a kind of political necessity, a
means of maintaining social peace. Employer surveys for decades have
shown that younger workers have little appreciation of the defined bene-
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fit plan. They look for a market wage and possibly health benefits. They
are unlikely to have knowingly accepted a lower wage for the pension
promise. Disclosure would do little good at a practical level since other
research indicates that little of the distributed material is read until the
worker feels a problem. As we have seen in the area of retiree medical
insurance in the United States, disclosure of the employer's right to take
the plan away does not make workers accept an employer's doing it.
Pesando cites a number of areas where design of the program allows
abuses to arise. Several legislative efforts have sought to correct these
areas, and relative to the original 1974 statute much progress has been
made in the United States. The author could not be more correct in
suggesting that efficiency concerns are not linked to public policy and
the program. I do agree with the tie to industrial decline, as the program
allows smoother economic transitions and less political and social upheaval as a result. The creation last year of a new guaranty program for
the retiree medical benefits of retired miners is further evidence of this
line of argument.
Having been involved in the earliest studies in 1976 of the premium
structure of the U.S. program, I note that the history of the program is a
series of compromises aimed at maintaining a defined benefit pension
system. The objective has been a PBGC that is solvent in the long run, not
one made insolvent overnight by policy change that drives any employer
with a well-funded plan to drop it. This desire for balance can be seen in
the PBGC reform debates of the last 20 years.
Pesando states in his review of the United States' system that the stated
intent is to ensure that ultimately pension benefits are fully funded. His
review of ways in which this occurs is accurate. They also reveal why the
law is what it is. The objective is retirement income and funding to pay
the benefit when due, not a fully funded plan every day. Investment policy that emphasizes equities with high volatility suggest that it is assumed
that at times the market will be down and unfunded liabilities will exist.
Advocates of full funding have argued for all bond "immunized" portfolios for this reason. The sponsors of plans have rejected this logic. The
original law contemplated the cross-subsidies the author identifies and
each amendment of the law has reinforced that intent. At the same time,
each amendment has sought to adjust the abuse potential he identifies.
Canada sought advice early from the PBGC on the advantages and
disadvantages of such a program. Ontario was the leader in interest, and,
as Pesando notes, the only province to take action. I agree with him that
the union influence was significant, as it was in creation of the PBGC.
The unique characteristics of the system in the United Kingdom were
the price to be paid for the concept of contracting out and the creation
of individual pensions. The absence of flat dollar plans is a reasonable
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explanation for well-funded plans in the United Kingdom. Another,
which may not last, has been tax laws that have given sponsors more
flexibility than in the United States to fund as much as they wish in
profitable years. These laws have taken on a more American restrictiveness in recent years, which may show up in poorer funding in the future.
German employers have been willing to finance a system with annual
assessments. Therefore, the system is always funded on a current basis but
does not require projections of future economic health. Because the
event for payment by the agency is insolvency of the enterprise, there is
limited incentive to game the system. I would argue that insolvency in
Germany is a far more effective moral hazard protection than the system
in the United States. And German firms do prefer putting capital to work
inside their firms, rather than in the broader economy. If they cannot
generate higher internal returns, why remain in business?
I would speculate that if the United States changed to a system of an
annual accounting and an insolvency basis, much of the present angst
would go away. There is not a general taxpayer guarantee to the PBGC,
yet it is the "fear" of possible taxpayer liability that seems to drive much of
the United States concern.
Discussion of the PBGC in comparison with the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation is fundamentally flawed since the promises,
and the payment method for those promises, are so different (as is the
underlying investment base of the pension system versus the dominance
of real estate). Those with the greatest stated concerns do not find comfort in the social insurance aspect of the PBGC that was intended by
Congress. "Reform" of the PBGC would happen quickly if many others
did not find the social component a critical part of the program. This
social factor is also the major reason that the program would be favored
by many even if employees had been offered explicit cash compensation
reductions in exchange for the pension promise. PBGC represents a
balance of economic and social logic. One circumstance under which
PBGC might go away or change fundamentally would be a decision by
unions to drop defined plans in favor of defined contributions plans
rather than maintaining a continued clear preference for the former.

Conclusion
The future of the PBGC can only be determined after Congress articulates its goals for the program. Many of the proposals put forth by analysts
today advocate a mission and goals different from those set forth in
ERISA (as amended).
The program was legislatively established with social insurance goals. A
move to the casualty insurance model may well be justified, but it carries
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with it a fundamental change of mission. Too many analysts fail to begin
their work with an articulation of why Congress was wrong and why they
should change the mission. Instead, they analyze the program against a
casualty model and declare the program in need of reform. By so doing,
they confuse rather than enlighten. The time for clearer presentations is
long overdue. Those who want change should be clear that they are
advocates as well as analysts - advocates for a change of mission, not for
more effective implementation of the present mission. The present mission is social insurance. Against that mission the PBGC has been a very
successful agency.
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